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Abstract 
 
In evolutionary game theory, the effect of public goods like 
diffusible molecules has been modelled using linear, concave, 
sigmoid and step functions. The observation that biological 
systems are often sigmoid input-output functions, as described 
by the Hill equation, suggests that a sigmoid function is more 
realistic. The Michaelis-Menten model of enzyme kinetics, 
however, predicts a concave function, and while mechanistic 
explanations of sigmoid kinetics exist, we lack an adaptive 
explanation: what is the evolutionary advantage of a sigmoid 
benefit function? We analyse public goods games in which the 
shape of the benefit function can evolve, in order to determine 
the optimal and evolutionarily stable Hill coefficients. We find 
that, while the dynamics depends on whether output is controlled 
at the level of the individual or the population, intermediate 
or high Hill coefficients often evolve, leading to sigmoid 
input-output functions that for some parameters are so steep to 
resemble a step function (an on-off switch). Our results suggest 
that, even when the shape of the benefit function is unknown, 
biological public goods should be modelled using a sigmoid or 
step function rather than a linear or concave function. 
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Introduction 
 
Sigmoid benefits in evolutionary public goods games 
 
Situations in which individuals produce public goods that confer 
a collective benefit to a group are widespread in biology. 
Beside human and animal societies, the production of public 
goods is common in cellular interactions, where molecules that 
enhance fitness, like growth factors, can diffuse between cells. 
Public goods games in evolutionary game theory must make 
assumptions about the effect of such diffusible molecules, and 
hence of their resulting benefit: additive effects make the 
benefit linear (the “N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma” [Hamburger 
1973]); synergistic effects produce non-linear benefits, and 
models of non-linear games [reviewed by Archetti & Scheuring 
2012] include concave, sigmoid and step functions [e.g.: Motro 
1991, Hauert et al. 2006, Frank 2010, Archetti & Scheuring 2011, 
Archetti et al. 2011, Deng & Chu 2011, Szathmáry 2011, Cornforth 
et al. 2012]. Because these models have different dynamics and 
equilibria, it is important to understand which of these 
functions is the most realistic approximation of biological 
public goods.  
  Examples of sigmoid public goods are commonly found in 
both prokaryotes [e.g.: Chuang et al. 2010, Cornforth et al. 
2012] and eukaryotes [e.g.: Karey & Sirbasku 1988; Jourdan et al 
1995]. More in general, biological input-output systems often 
show a slow response at low input levels, followed by a steep 
increase in response at intermediate levels and again a 
decreasing sensitivity as input levels increases [Tyson et al 
2003, Cornish-Bowden 2012, Zhang et al 2013, Frank 2013]. In 
other words, the effect of a biological molecule is often a 
sigmoid function of its concentration. This kinetics is often 
described by the Hill equation [Hill 1910; Cornish-Bowden 2012]. 
In many cases the switch from low to high output is so sudden 
(that is, the sigmoid function is so steep) that the system has 
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essentially a bistable response, switching between “off” and 
“on” like a transistor in a circuit [Sarpeshkar 2010]. Public 
goods in biology could then probably be modelled using a sigmoid 
function, or a step function as an approximation of a very steep 
sigmoid function. A problem remains, however: why a sigmoid 
shape rather than a concave shape?  
 
Why are sigmoid functions common? 
 
Why are biological systems often sigmoid (or step) functions? 
Saturation at high concentration is not surprising, since 
maximum output is intrinsically limited. The commonly observed 
low response at low input intensity followed by a steep increase 
at intermediate levels, however, is puzzling [Frank 2013] 
because the fundamental Michaelis-Menten theory of enzyme 
kinetics predicts a strong output sensitivity (nearly linear) at 
low input concentrations [Tyson et al 2003, Cornish-Bowden 
2012], followed by a reduced sensitivity, that is, a saturating 
effect leading to a concave function. This linear sensitivity at 
low input predicted by the Michaelis-Menten kinetics is at odds 
with the weak logarithmic sensitivity at low input (that is, the 
sigmoid shape) commonly observed in biological systems. The 
question is, therefore: why do biological systems normally 
follows a sigmoid “Hill kinetics”, rather than a concave 
“Michaelis-Menten kinetics”? Frank [2013] discusses the puzzle 
extensively. 
 There are various proximate explanations for the Hill 
equation. The most basic explanation [Cornish-Bowden 2012] is 
positive cooperative binding: since, many proteins are 
oligomeric, and ligands at one binding site can affect the 
binding affinity of the other subunits, if transforming a single 
molecule to an active state requires simultaneous binding by 
multiple input signal molecules (“positive cooperativity”) the 
resulting kinetics is a sigmoid curve. Other explanations [Zhang 
et al 2013] include titration of a repressor (the initial 
reaction may inactivate the input signal molecule or reduce 
sensitivity to low intensity input signals), and opposing 
saturated forward and back reactions (a back reaction may return 
the active form produced by the initial reaction to the inactive 
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state, and if the back reaction saturates at low signal input 
intensity, then a logarithmic output will result at low input 
intensity). 
 At a different level of explanation, however, the question 
remains unanswered: what is the adaptive value of a sigmoid 
kinetics? We understand that positive cooperative binding, for 
example, leads to high Hill coefficients (steep sigmoid curves), 
that is, we understand that cooperative binding is a plausible 
proximate explanation; what is, however, its adaptive value? 
Cooperative binding in principle can be positive (if ligand 
binding increases the affinity of subsequent ligands) or 
negative (if ligand binding reduces the affinity of subsequent 
ligands). Only positive cooperative binding generates a sigmoid 
curve. Our question is, therefore: why is cooperative binding 
often positive rather than negative? The degree of cooperative 
binding (as well as the degree of titration of repressors and 
the speed of forward and back reactions — and, more in general, 
the complexity of signaling systems), are themselves under 
natural selection a d can easily change from one to the other 
[Figure 1]. Why should they evolve to generate a sigmoid shape 
rather than a concave shape? Does a sigmoid shape lead to higher 
fitness than a concave shape?  
 
A mechanism design question 
 
Studies of public goods in evolutionary game theory usually 
analyse the dynamics of games with a given benefit function and 
investigate how cooperation for the production of the public 
good is maintained. The question is interesting because of the 
intrinsic inefficiency in the production of public goods, due to 
the incentive to free-ride on the contribution of other group 
members. Here, however, we address a different question: what is 
the best shape for the benefit function? We are interested in 
the evolution of the game itself (more specifically, its benefit 
function), rather than the dynamics and equilibria of a game 
with a given benefit function. Ours is, therefore, a mechanism 
design (reverse game theory [Myerson 1998]) question: if the 
rules of the game itself (the input-output function) can evolve, 
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what game will evolve? In our case the game is defined by the 
shape of the benefit function. 
 Our scope is to test whether Darwinian selection would lead 
to the sigmoid shape we usually observe in nature and, if this 
is the case, to understand why. A secondary question that arises 
is: will the production of the molecule be maximised at this 
equilibrium? It is possible that the optimal Hill coefficient 
from the point of view of the population is different from its 
evolutionarily stable value. That is, it is possible that 
evolutionary dynamics leads to a benefit function that is not 
optimal for the population. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Determining the optimal Hill coefficients 
 
In biochemistry the fraction of macromolecule saturated by a 
ligand (that is, output) as a function of the ligand 
concentration (input) is often described by the Hill equation 
[Hill 1910; Cornish-Bowden 2012]: 
 
o(i)=i
s
/[k
s
+i
s
]=1/[1+(k/i)
s
]        
        (1) 
 
The “Hill coefficient” s controls the steepness of the input-
output function [Figure 1]; k controls its inflection point (this 
is sometimes described as the ligand concentration occupying 
half of the binding sites, that is, concentration for which 
output is half the maximum); a Hill coefficient greater than one 
means that the function is sigmoid, for instance because of 
positive cooperative binding. 
 We analyse the problem of the evolution of Hill 
coefficients by studying systems in which individual cells with 
mutations for Hill coefficients arise in a population of cells, 
and by analysing whether these mutant cells can invade the 
population. Assuming that the input molecule has some autocrine 
and paracrine beneficial effect (that is, a beneficial effect on 
both producer and non-producer cells), and assuming large well-
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mixed populations in which groups of size n are formed at random 
at every generation, the fitnesses of a producer cell (C) and of 
a non-producer cell (D) are given by, respectively 
 
 

C
(x) 
n 1
j





 x
j(1 x)n1 j b
j0
n1
 (j 1)c               
(2) 
 

D
(x) 
n 1
j





 x
j(1 x)n1 j b
j0
n1
 (j)               
(3) 
 
where c>0 is the cost paid by a producer cell for the production 
of the molecule; the benefit b is a function of the number (j) 
of other cells that produce the molecule in a group of size n 
(therefore a producer will be in a group with j+1 producers 
(itself plus j other), whereas a non-producer will be in a group 
of j producers) We assume that this benefit b(j) is a normalised 
version of the Hill equation (1), that is  
 
b(j)=o(j)/o(n)           
        (4) 
 
(normalization has negligible effects for most values of s, and 
ensures that the maximum benefit is the same for all values of 
s) [Figure 1]. x is the fraction of producers in a polymorphic 
population or, in a monomorphic population, the probability of 
producing the molecule (0≤x≤1). It is also convenient to define 
h=k/n. The average fitness of the population is x∙πC+(1-x)∙πD. 
The evolutionary dynamics [Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998] of the 
system is given by the replicator equation: 
 
 &x  x(1 x)[(x)c]                 
(5) 
 
where the fitness difference  C(x) D(x) is here written in the 
form (x)-c, and 
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(x)=
 
n 1
j





 x
j(1 x)n1 j  b
j
j0
n1
                
(6) 
 
where bj=b(j+1)-b(j)>0 for j=0, … , n-1. The dynamics (5) has 
two trivial rest points x=0 and x=1; further possible interior 
rest points are given by the roots of the equations  
 
(x)-c=0                  
(7) 
 
These two interior rest points cannot be found analytically but 
it is known that for a sigmoid function there are at most two 
such points, and that the higher value corresponds to the stable 
point [Archetti & Scheuring 2011, 2012, Archetti 2013]. We 
determine the values of x and s that maximizes fitness, as well 
as their equilibrium values, by numerical simulations. Whether 
the relevant values are the equilibria or the maxima depends on 
what scenario we are analysing. 
 
 
 
 
Different scenarios 
 
There are three possible scenarios based on how the Hill 
coefficient (s) and the amount of producer cells (or the 
fraction of producers, x) are determined. 
 
- Both s and x are determined centrally. A multicellular 
individual can determine the value of x and s of all its cells. 
The goal of our analysis in this case is simply to find the 
values of x and s that maximise the average fitness of the cell 
population (the organism itself). 
 
- Only s is centrally determined, while x is determined 
individually. This may be the case, for example, in cancer 
development, where individual cells can mutate and change their 
production of the molecule. In this case we must first find the 
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equilibrium value of x for any given s and we must then find the 
value of s the maximizes fitness given the equilibrium value of 
x. 
 
- Both s and x are determined individually. In a population of 
bacteria or unicellular eukaryotes, s and x can be determined by 
each individual cell independently. Therefore in this case we 
must find the evolutionarily stable values of both x and s. We 
assume that mutant cells with slightly different values of s and 
x (that is, phenotypically close to the resident phenotype) 
arise in the population and we determine whether these mutants 
invade the resident population. The stable values are the ones 
that cannot be invaded by any mutant. 
 
In principle one could also analyse the case in which x is 
centrally determined and s is determined individually. Since x 
can evolve more rapidly than s (simply by different growth rates 
of producers and non-producers, rather than by the accumulation 
of mutations that change the Hill coefficient), this scenario is 
unlikely in a multicellular organism and this case can be 
considered a special case of the third scenario (where both s 
and x are determined individually, in unicellular organisms). 
 
 
Results 
 
Both s and x are determined centrally 
 
In this case we determine the values of x and s that maximize 
population fitness. The results [Figure 2] can be divided in two 
classes: 
 
- For high values of h/c (the bottom left part of the panels in 
Figure 2) the resulting benefit function is a sigmoid or almost 
concave function (s is low), especially for low values of h, and 
all cells produce the same amount of molecule (x=1). 
- For low values of h/c the resulting benefit function is a step 
function, that is, an on/off switch (s in the highest possible), 
and the population is a mixture of producers and non producers 
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(or a monomorphic population in which all cells produce the 
molecule with frequency x<1). 
 
The reason why there are two classes of results is not intuitive 
but can be understood by inspecting Figure 3. The average fitness 
for a steep function benefit declines with x if x>h, whereas 
average fitness for a concave function always increases with x. 
They, however, do not change (decrease and increase 
respectively) at the same rate with x. Therefore there are 
critical values of x and h for which the optimum switches from 
one class to the other. More in general, the rationale of this 
result is the following: if the benefit of a diffusible molecule 
is nonlinear, with diminishing returns as the concentration of 
the molecule increases, and if producing the molecule is costly, 
it is not efficient to have a population of cells in which all 
cells produce the molecule; the fraction of producers necessary 
to achieve a given benefit (or equivalently, in a monomorphic 
population, the production level of the molecule) and in this 
case, as we have seen in Figure 3, because of the very nature of 
sigmoid benefit functions, the optimal shape is the steepest 
possible function. If the cost is very low, instead, or the 
amount of molecule necessary (h) is high, all cells must produce 
the molecule and in that case the optimal shape is a sigmoid 
function [Figure 3]. 
 
Only s is centrally determined; x is determined individually. 
 
In this scenario x is not centrally determined, hence we must 
find its equilibrium value, given that each cell has an 
incentive to maximize its own fitness. Once we have determined 
the evolutionarily stable value of x for all possible values of 
s, we calculate fitness at that value of x [Figure 4]. The next 
step is to find the value of s that leads to the maximum fitness 
value (given that x evolves to its equilibrium value). The 
result is that the value of s that maximizes average fitness is 
intermediate for low values of h (irrespective of c); for 
intermediate values of h it is the highest possible when c is 
high, and low or intermediate when c is low; and it is again 
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intermediate for high values of h (irrespective of c) [Figure 5]. 
In summary, there are, again, two classes of results [Figure 6]: 
- For high values of h/c (the bottom left part of the panels in 
Figure 5) a sigmoid or almost concave benefit function (low s), and 
all cells produce the same amount of molecule (x=1). 
- For low values of h/c a step function, that is, an on/off 
switch (the highest possible s), and a polymorphic population of 
producers and non producers (or a monomorphic population in 
which all cells produce the molecule with frequency x<1). For 
very low values of h, however, the optimal s is lower. 
 
The reason why the Hill coefficient can evolve to be 
intermediate is not intuitive, but can be understood by 
inspecting Figure 7: because of the very shape of the benefit 
function, the value of s that maximizes the equilibrium value of 
x is often intermediate. This means that the output (benefit) at 
the equilibrium value of x is also maximised at intermediate 
values of s. While the same logic does not apply to our 
scenario, since we are looking at the s value that maximizes 
fitness (which depends also on the cost of production), rather 
than x or output, it provides an intuitive reason why 
intermediate Hill coefficients can improve fitness. Note also 
that at this equilibrium values of x, fitness is generally lower 
than the maximum possible fitness; hence the social dilemma that 
generally arises in collective action problems for the 
production of diffusible molecules by selfish replicators 
 
Both x and s are individually determined. 
 
Finally we analyse the scenario in which there is no central 
authority: both s and x are determined individually at the level 
of the cell. In this case not only do we have to calculate the 
equilibrium value of x and fitness at this value; we must also 
find the evolutionarily stable value of s, that is, the value of 
s that cannot be invaded by local mutants [Figure 8]. Figure 9 shows 
the equilibrium values of s. Results are similar to the previous 
two scenarios, although in this case a step functions evolves 
only for a very limited set of parameters: 
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- For high values of h/c (the bottom left part of the panels in 
Figure 9) a sigmoid or almost concave benefit function (low s), and 
all cells produce the same amount of molecule (x=1). 
- For low values of h/c a steeper function (high s), steeper for 
higher values of h, and a polymorphic population of producers 
and non producers (or a monomorphic population in which all 
cells produce the molecule with frequency x<1). 
 
Summary of the results 
 
In summary [Figure 10], the resulting system is a steep input-
output sigmoid function (essentially a bistable system that 
resembles an on/off switch) if the relative cost/benefit ratio 
of the molecule is not negligible, or even if the cost is small 
and h is small (unless both s and x are centrally determined); 
it is a less steep sigmoid function if h is high enough and the 
cost is negligible; it is a concave function if both s and x are 
centrally determined and the cost is small.
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Discussion 
  
Our results 
 
As we have seen, the results depend, in principle, on whether 
individual cells act to maximise their own individual fitness 
(which may be the case in microbes and cancer cells) or the 
fitness of the organism (which is the case in multicellular 
organisms), as the optimal value is the one that would maximise 
population fitness, whereas the evolutionarily stable value is 
the one that natural selection actually leads to (the two are 
not necessarily equivalent). Although the three scenarios we 
have analysed could lead in principle to very different results, 
our results show a common pattern.  
 For high values of h/c the Hill coefficient s evolves to a 
low or intermediate value, that is, the effect of the molecule 
evolves to be an almost concave or slightly sigmoid function of 
its concentration; the fraction of producers x evolves to 1, 
that is, all cells produce the molecule. For low values of h/c, 
instead, the Hill coefficient s evolves to higher values, that 
is, the effect of the molecule evolves to be a steeper sigmoid 
curve or even a step function (an on/off switch) [Figure 10]. Not 
surprisingly, fitness is higher (by up to 15%) when both x and s 
are determined at the population level rather than at the 
individual level [Figure 11]. 
 While we have not discussed the evolution of h and c, both 
are clearly under selection to be as small as possible: c 
because reducing the cost of production increases fitness, and h 
because the lower h is the higher the benefit is for a given 
amount of molecule. Arguably they are also, however, constrained 
by intrinsic properties of the molecule, which prevent h and c 
from becoming zero. Hence, we cannot predict whether evolution 
will tend to produce results of one class or the other, let 
alone the exact values of h and c. We can argue, however, that 
there is selection for reducing h and c. 
 If h is low enough, that is, if the molecules produced by 
one cell can induce a benefit in many other surrounding cells, 
our results can be summarized, roughly, by saying that a sigmoid 
function evolves if the cost of producing a molecule is not 
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negligible. As a consequence, when the production of a public 
good is costly, it seems generally reasonable to assume that the 
benefit is a sigmoid function of the amount of public good.  
 
Further work 
 
Clearly there are limitations in our analysis. We have assumed, 
for instance, that there is no cost for increasing s. However, 
while changing s is likely to involve some costs [Frank 2013], 
this would arguably only shift the equilibrium value of s to a 
lower value than the ones reported in our analysis.  
 A second simplification in our analysis is the assumption 
that there is no assortment and no relatedness among cells. This 
is also unlikely, and adding assortment to our model would 
likely lead to higher cooperation among cells. It would be 
interesting to study its effects on the evolution of Hill 
coefficients. We have assumed that the results apply to both 
polymorphic populations with two cell types (producers and non-
producers) in which x defines the fraction of producer cells, 
and to monomorphic populations with one type producing an amount 
x of molecule per unit time (normalized between 0 and 1). The 
two cases may have different dynamics if relatedness is included 
in the model. 
 Finally, our results were derived using a relatively low 
group size (n) for practical computational reasons; the value of 
n in groups of cells is probably higher. We know, however, that 
n affects the critical c value that makes the system bistable 
without affecting the dynamics, at least qualitatively [Archetti 
& Scheuring 2011, 2012]. Therefore it seems reasonable that 
increasing the value of n would only reduce the critical values 
of c we reported here. 
 
Importance of the Hill equation 
 
The Hill equation is widely used in biochemistry (where it 
describes many cases of enzyme kinetics) [e.g.: Tyson et al 
2003, Cornish-Bowden 2012, Zhang et al 2013], systems biology 
(where the interest is focused on proximate explanations) [e.g.: 
Kolch et al. 2005, Kim & Ferrell 2007, Ferrell 2009, Cohen-
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Saidon et al. 2009, Goentoro & Kirschner 2009, Goentoro et al 
2009] and pharmacology (mainly for describing dose-response 
patterns) [e.g.: DeLean et al. 1978, Hoffman & Goldberg 1994, 
Weiss 1997, Rang 2006]. As Frank [2013] points out, while the 
discussion on the Hill equation is scattered through different 
fields, all seem to recognise it as an important issue. Cornish-
Bowden’s [2012] provide a useful basic introduction, and Zhang 
et al. [2013] review various proximate explanations. Frank 
[2013] discusses the different approaches, and we refer the 
reader to his review for further references. Frank [2013] is 
also the first to attempt a general explanation for the 
evolution of Hill coefficients, describing how aggregation, 
measurement and scale can explain observed input-output 
relations. 
 In evolutionary game theory, in the study of the evolution 
of public goods, sigmoid functions have been modelled mainly 
using the logistic equation to analyse the production of non-
linear public goods [Archetti & Scheuring 2011, Archetti et al. 
2011, Deng & Chu 2011], and it is known that concave functions 
[Motro 1991, Hauert et al. 2006, Frank 2010] lead to a different 
type of dynamics [Archetti & Scheuring 2012]. It is interesting 
that sigmoid input-output functions are not limited to 
interactions between cells and molecules [e.g.: Chuang et al. 
2010, Cornforth et al. 2012, Karey & Sirbasku 1988; Jourdan et 
al 1995, Archetti et al. 2015], but have been described for 
behavioural interactions in animal societies, where the benefit 
of social interactions in a group are often non-linear (in some 
cases sigmoid) functions of the number of cooperative members 
[Rabenold 1984, Bednarz 1988, Packer et al. 1990, Stander 1991, 
Creel 1997, Yip et al. 2008]. While our argument was essentially 
about enzyme kinetics, and therefore we have assume that the 
individual players are individual cells and the population is a 
population of cells, our model applies beyond biochemistry, if 
we consider that the individuals are actual individual organisms 
in a population (a society).  
 It is perhaps worth noting that the improved efficiency we 
showed for the first scenario (central control of s and x), 
which applies to multicellular organisms, would be an additional 
benefit of multicellularity, besides the efficient division of 
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labor that is generally thought to be the main advantage of 
multicellularity [Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995]. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In spite of the importance of the Hill equation in different 
fields, and in spite of the existence of many proximate 
explanations for sigmoid input-output functions, an adaptive 
explanation is still lacking. Why does natural selection often 
promotes the evolution of sigmoid functions in input-output 
systems? The puzzle [Frank 2013] arises from the fact that, as 
we have discussed, the fundamental enzyme kinetics described by 
the Michaelis-Menten equation predicts a concave function, 
rather than a sigmoid function. Our goal therefore was to 
determine whether natural selection for optimal Hill 
coefficients would lead to the evolution of sigmoid input-output 
systems. The results that emerge from our analysis seems robust 
to different assumptions on how the Hill coefficient is 
determined, and apply to unicellular and multicellular 
organisms: a sigmoid input-output kinetics is the most likely 
result of selection for mutant Hill coefficients. Our results 
add a further level of explanation to current proximate 
explanations of the Hill kinetics (cooperative binding, 
titration of repressors and opposing saturated forward and back 
reactions): the ultimate, adaptive, explanation of the Hill 
kinetics often observed in biological input-output systems is 
that a sigmoid shape of the benefit function, or even a step 
function, leads to higher fitness than a concave function. 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
Steve Frank provided valuable comments on a previous version of 
this article. The research leading to these results has received 
funding from the People Programme of the European Union's 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under REA grant 
agreement n° 627816 to M.A. and from OTKA grant number K100299 
to I.S. 
 
 
   16 
References 
 
Archetti M (2013) Evolutionary game theory of growth factor 
production: implications for tumour heterogeneity and resistance 
to therapies. British Journal of Cancer 109:1056-1062 
Archetti M, Ferraro DA, Christofori G (2015) Heterogeneity for 
IGF-II production maintained by public goods dynamics in 
neuroendocrine pancreatic cancer. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 
112:1833–1838 
Archetti M, Scheuring I (2011) Coexistence of cooperation and 
defection in public goods games. Evolution 65:1140-1148. 
Archetti M, Scheuring I (2012) Review: Game theory of public 
goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment. J. Theor. 
Biol. 299:9-20. 
Archetti M, Scheuring I, Hoffman M, Frederickson M, Pierce N, Yu 
D (2011) Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation. 
Ecology Letters 14: 1300-1312 
Bednarz JC (1988). Cooperative hunting Harris' hawks (Parabuteo 
unicinctus). Science 239:1525–1527. 
Chuang JS, Rivoire O, Leibler S (2010) Cooperation and 
Hamilton's rule in a simple synthetic microbial system. Mol Syst 
Biol. 6:398. 
Cohen-Saidon C, Cohen AA, Sigal A, Liron Y, Alon U (2009) 
Dynamics and variability of ERK2 response to EGF in individual 
living cells. Mol Cell 2009, 36:885–893. 
Cornforth DM, Sumpter D, Brown SP, Brannstrom A (2012) Synergy 
and group size in microbial cooperation. American Naturalist 
180, 296-305. 
Cornish-Bowden (2012) Fundamentals of Enzyme Kinetics, 4th 
edition; Wiley Blackwell 
Creel, S. (1997). Cooperative hunting and group size: 
assumptions and currencies. Anim. Behav. 54, 1319–1324. 
DeLean A, Munson P, Rodbard D (1978) Simultaneous analysis of 
families of sigmoidal curves: application to bioassay, 
radioligand assay, and physiological dose-response curves. Am J 
Physiol-Endocrinol Metab. 235:97–102. 
Deng K, Chu T (2011) Adaptive evolution of cooperation through 
darwinian dynamics in public goods games. PLoS ONE 6(10): 
e25496. 
   17 
Ferrell JE (2009) Signaling motifs and Weber’s law. Mol Cell 
36:724–727. 
Frank SA (2010) A general model of the public goods dilemma. J. 
Evol. Biol. 23:1245-1250. 
Frank SA (2013) Input-output relations in biological systems: 
measurement, information and the Hill equation. Biology Direct 
8:31 
Goentoro L, Kirschner MW (2009) Evidence that fold-change, and 
not absolute level, of É¿-catenin dictates Wnt signaling. Mol 
Cell 36:872–884. 
Goentoro L, Shoval O, Kirschner MW, Alon U (2009) The incoherent 
feedforward loop can provide fold-change detection in gene 
regulation. Mol Cell 36:894–899. 
Hamburger H. (1973). N-person Prisoners Dilemma. Journal Of 
Mathematical Sociology 3, 27-48. 
Hauert C, Michor F, Nowak MA, Doebeli M (2006) Synergy and 
discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol. 
239, 195-202. 
Hill, A. V. (1910). The possible effects of the aggregation of 
the molecules of hæmoglobin on its dissociation curves. 
Proceedings of the Physiological Society Jan 1910. 
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population 
Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffman A, Goldberg A (1994) The relationship between receptor-
effector unit heterogeneity and the shape of the concentration-
effect profile: pharmacodynamic implications. J Pharmacokinet 
Biopharm 22:449–468. 
Jourdan M, et al. (2005) Delineation of the roles of paracrine 
and autocrine interleukin-6 (IL-6) in myeloma cell lines in 
survival versus cell cycle. A possible model for the cooperation 
of myeloma cell growth factors. Eur Cytokine Netw 16:57–64.  
Karey KP, Sirbasku DA (1988) Differential responsiveness of 
human breast cancer cell lines MCF-7 and T47D to growth factors 
and 17 beta-estradiol. Cancer Res 48: 4083–4092.  
Kim SY, Ferrell JE (2007) Substrate competition as a source of 
ultrasensitivity in the inactivation of Wee1. Cell 128:1133–
1145. 
   18 
Kolch W, Calder M, Gilbert D (2005) When kinases meet 
mathematics: the systems biology of MAPK, signalling. FEBS Lett 
579:1891–1895. 
Maynard Smith, J, Szathmáry E (1995) The Major Transitions in 
Evolution. Oxford University Press 
Motro, U. (1991). Co-operation and defection, playing the field 
and ESS. J Theor Biol 151: 145-154. 
Myerson RB (2008) Mechanism design, in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, Eds. Durlauf SN, Blume LE. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Packer, C., Scheel, D., Pusey, A.E. (1990) Why lions form 
groups: food is not enough. Am Nat 136, 1-19. 
Rabenold, K.N. (1984) Cooperative enhancement of reproductive 
success in tropical wren societies. Ecology 65, 871-885.  
Rang HP (2006) The receptor concept: pharmacology’s big idea. Br 
J Pharmacol 147:9–16. 
Sarpeshkar R (2010) Ultra Low Power Bioelectronics. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stander, P.E. (1991) Foraging dynamics of lions in semi-arid 
environment. Can J. Zool 70, 8-21. 
Szathmáry E (2011) Evolution. To group or not to group? Science 
334:1648-1649. 
Tyson JJ, Chen KC, Novak B (2003) Sniffers, buzzers, toggles and 
blinkers: dynamics of regulatory and signaling pathways in the 
cell. Curr Opin Cell Biol 15:221–231. 
Weiss JN (1997) The Hill equation revisited: uses and misuses. 
FASEB J 11:835–841. 
Yip, E. C., Powers, K. S., Aviles, L. (2008) Cooperative capture 
of large prey solves scaling challenge faced by spider 
societies. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105: 11818-11822. 
Zhang Q, Bhattacharya S, Andersen ME (2013) Ultrasensitive 
response motifs: basic amplifiers in molecular signalling 
networks. Open Biol 3:130031. 
 
 
 
 
 
   19 
Figure 1. Sigmoid input-output functions described by the Hill equation. The benefit 
of a diffusible molecule is plotted as a function of x (the 
level of production of the molecule), for different values of 
the Hill coefficient s; h=0.5 (the inflection point of the Hill 
equation); n=20. While the Michaelis-Menten kinetics predict a 
Hill coefficient s close to 1, higher values are commonly 
observed in biological systems. 
 
Figure 2. Equilibria when s and x are centrally determined. The values of s (the 
Hill coefficient) and x (the level of production of the 
molecule) that maximise fitness, and fitness at these values, as 
a function of h (the inflection point of the Hill equation) and 
c (the cost of producing the molecule); n=20. 
 
Figure 3. Two classes of optimal Hill coefficients when s and x are centrally determined. 
The thick red curves show (left) the average fitness function 
(as a function of x, the level of production of the molecule) 
for the value of s (the Hill coefficient) that maximizes average 
fitness (the arrow marks the value of x at which the maximum 
occurs) and (right) the input-output function with that s value. 
In this example, when h=0.6 fitness is maximised at an 
intermediate value of x. When h increases to 0.7 fitness is 
maximised at x=1. Two classes of results occur because when the 
highest fitness occurs at x=1, it does for low s values; when it 
occurs at intermediate x it does so for the highest s. value. In 
both cases c=0.1, n=20. 
 
Figure 4. The stable value of x and the corresponding average fitness when x is determined 
individually. Each cell shows xeq, the value of the stable equilibrium 
of x (the level of production of the molecule), and the 
corresponding average fitness (weq), as a function of h (the 
inflection point of the Hill equation) and c (the cost of 
producing the molecule), for different values of s (the Hill 
coefficient); n=20. 
 
Figure 5. Fitness at the equilibrium value of x when x is determined individually. The 
equilibrium value of fitness (weq) as a function of s (the Hill 
coefficient), when x (the level of production of the molecule) 
is determined at the level of individual cells, for different 
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values of h (the inflection point of the Hill equation) and c 
(the cost of producing the molecule — gray lines); n=20. 
 
Figure 6. Equilibria when x is determined individually. The values of s (the 
Hill coefficient) that maximize the average fitness (weq) 
calculated when x (the level of production of the molecule) 
evolves to its equilibrium value (xeq), xeq at this value of s and 
weq at this value of s, as a function of h (the inflection point 
of the Hill equation) and c (the cost of producing the 
molecule); n=20. 
Figure 7. An intermediate Hill coefficient may lead to the highest possible output. When 
only s  (the Hill coefficient) is centrally determined, the 
equilibrium value of x (the level of production of the molecule) 
occurs where the gradient of selection (left panel — the benefit 
difference between producers and non-producers) equals the cost 
of production c, changing from positive to negative (shown by a 
circle; arrows show the direction of the dynamics). As a 
consequence, the value of s that maximises the equilibrium value 
of x can be intermediate. In this case (c=0.05, n=20), the value 
of s that leads to the maximum equilibrium value of x is 7.4 
(the corresponding functions are shown as thick black curves), 
which leads to a sigmoid input-output shape (right panel). 
 
Figure 8. Evolutionary dynamics of the Hill coefficient. The stable value s of the 
Hill coefficient seq is found where the equilibrium fitness 
(calculated at the equilibrium value of x, xeq) of the mutant 
(with a higher value of s) w*eq changes from being higher to 
being lower than the equilibrium fitness (at xeq) of the resident 
phenotype (weq). Here c=0.02; h=0.5; s*=s*1.2; n=20. Arrows show 
the direction of the dynamics. 
 
Figure 9. Evolutionary equilibria of input-output dynamics when s and x are individually 
determined. The equilibrium value of s as a function of h (the 
inflection point of the Hill equation) and c (the cost of 
producing the molecule), given that both s (the Hill 
coefficient) and x  (the level of production of the molecule) 
evolve to their equilibrium value; n=20. 
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Figure 10. Shape of the input-output function evolving under the three scenarios. The 
input-output (benefit) function resulting from the stable Hill 
coefficient (s) under the three scenarios for h=0.2 and h=0.5, 
and for c=0.01 (dotted curve) and c=0.1 (solid curve); for 
reference, gray curves show the function for values of s ranging 
from 1 (concave function) to 100 (approaching a step function); 
n=20 
 
Figure 11. When control depends on individual cells, inefficiency increases. The 
difference in fitness (at the equilibrium value of s) between 
the case in which control of x and s is centralised at the level 
of the population (W1, from Figure 2) and the case in which both 
x and s are decided at the level of the individual (W2, from 
Figure 9). The left panel is a detail of the right panel for low 
values of c; n=20. 
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Highlights 
• Public goods games often assume sigmoid effects for biological molecules 
• Sigmoid effects are not readily predicted by the Michaelis-Menten kinetics 
• We model selection on mutations that affect the shape of enzyme kinetics 
• We show that evolutionary dynamics often leads to a sigmoid shape 
